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Abstract
We investigate factors that determine firm markups by employing data on prices and
quantities of various medical procedures at major hospitals in the US. We focus on the
impact of hospital quality, rival competition, and the number of medical procedures
upon the health care demand. Our analysis covers health care markets across the US
with the market definition based upon the Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs). Our
findings highlight potential implications of the relationship between hospital markups
and market structure.
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1 Introduction
Personal health care expenditure in the US rose from 18% to 27% of per capita income
in the past decade. Changes in the size and structure of the health care industry have
attracted the attention of economists due to its profound impact on social welfare. The US
health care expenditure accounted for 17.9% of the GDP in 2010 with the amount spent per
capita reaching $8,417. Expenditure remained relatively steady for the next three years due
to the sluggish economic recovery until the Affordable Care Act came into effect that was
projected to create a growth in spending of 6.1%.1 Extensive consolidations among health
care providers on the other hand have contributed to industry concentration. In a recent
wave, 162 hospital mergers occurred between 2010 and 2011 (Gaynor et al. 2014) . A study
of competitive forces within the current structure of the health care markets is therefore
essential for uncovering the drivers of a substantial wedge between costs and prices.
We investigate factors that determine firm markups - the difference between price and
cost - by employing data on prices and quantities (number of discharges) of various medical
procedures at major hospitals in the US. We focus on the effects of hospital quality, rival
competition, and other determinants on health care demand. Our analysis covers the health
care industry across the US with the market definition based upon the Hospital Referral
Regions (HRRs). We also estimate the effect on markups of an increase in the number of
hospitals in the market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline
1Source: Centers for Medicate & Medical Services, http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/Proj2012.pdf.
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findings from the literature and describe the data. In section 3, we present empirical results
and in section 4, we offer concluding remarks.
2 Background and Data
Research on health care markets using techniques from the Industrial Organization toolkit
is picking up in recent years. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) study the relationship between
market structure and market size in five retail and professional industries including health
services. Their empirical results suggest that beyond five competitors, successive entrants
have little effect on competition. In geographical isolated markets, the effects of competitive
entry dissipate soon after the third firm enters the market in Abraham et al. (2007). Using a
dynamic model of entry and exit, Dunne et al. (2013) investigate the role of entry costs and
fixed costs on long-run firm values and market structure for dentists and chiropractors. Their
simulation exercises show that an entry cost subsidy increases price competition, leading to
higher firm turnover.
While the impact of competition on price is relatively clear, there is no concrete conclusion
in the literature about the impact of competition on quality.2 Kessler and McClellan (2000)
find that the probability of death for heart attack patients is significantly higher in a more
competitive market. Propper et al. (2004) and Propper et al. (2008) look at mortality in
the UK health service industry, and find that hospitals facing more competition have higher
death rates. In Beckert et al. (2012) the choices for hip replacement patients increase with
2See Gaynor and Town (2012) for summaries of the previous literature.
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hospital quality while hospital mergers may lead to decreased quality. In contrast, two recent
studies (Bloom et al. 2010; Beckert et al. 2012) show that competition improves hospital
quality. Bloom et al. (2010) find that adding another competitor increases management
quality and reduces mortality rates due to heart attack by 10.7%.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), signed in March 2010, in-
creased the use of primary care for the uninsured-lower income patients. This policy ex-
panded health insurance coverage and affected competition among insurers. Starc (2014)
shows that the Medicare Supplement insurance market is highly concentrated. She finds
evidence that substantial market power with strong brand royalty is associated with high
premiums. An increase in competition could result in higher consumer welfare.
The goal of our empirical model is to estimate demand and markups for different medical
procedures within the health care industry assessing the impact of a potential increase in
coverage and consolidation. We use aggregated level information as well as detailed informa-
tion on quantity and prices on 100 different medical procedures from the Dartmouth Atlas
of Health Care between 2010 and 2011.3 The market for hospital services is highly localized
in the US. Dranove et al. (1992) emphasize that properly defining the geographic market is
critical in empirical analysis in the health care industry. The unit of our health care markets
is HRR. Under the HRR system, hospitals have significant market power, as patients in an
HRR are referred to particular hospitals within that region. The defined markets are ade-
3According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, prices refer to the average total payments
to all providers for the MS-DRG (Medicare Severity Diagnosis Related Groups) “including the MS-DRG
amount, teaching, disproportionate share, capital, and outlier payments for all cases. Also included in
average total payments are co-payment and deductible amounts that the patient is responsible for and any
additional payments by third parties for coordination of benefits.”
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quate to examine geographic variation in health care utilization, quality, and expenditures.4
While most previous studies use the sample of geographically concentrated markets only
containing some of health care industry, our dataset covers the entire 306 referral areas in
the US. It provides us with significant geographic variation in different medical procedures.
Our dataset contains measures of market characteristics such as median household income
and number of insured people in the geographic market obtained from the Census Bureau.
Each county-level demographic variable is aggregated to HRRs. In particular, household
income is weighted by the population within a county. We divide the weighted income and
number of insured people by number of HRRs within the county if there are multiple HRRs
within a county. Then, we construct the regression demographic variables by summing up
the values within the same HRR. Finally, we use crosswalks to convert all county based data
to the HRR level. The use of a variety of demographic covariates could explain significant
geographic variations. In the regressions, we include a measure of the rival’s minimum price
charged to control for the relative strengths of competition a hospital faces within an HRR.
This variable summarizes the competitiveness in the local market and is widely accepted in
the empirical IO literature. Similar measures have been constructed in industries to identify
a competitor’s minimum distance to a work site, minimum worklog etc (for example see
De Silva et al. 2003, Bajari et al. 2014, and Jung et al. 2018).
4HRRs represent natural markets for tertiary care and are defined on the basis of where patients are
referred for cardiovascular surgical procedures or neurosurgery. See http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/
region/ for detailed descriptions of HRRs.
4
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Hospital Referral Regions
Variable Mean Standard Min MaxDeviation
Average price $ 9,607.58 $1,721.86 $6,521.39 $17,065.39
Average number of discharges 41.84 9.65 22.46 86.53
Number of hospitals 5.41 5.19 1.00 36.94
Household income $48,958.62 $9,841.60 $30,554.00 $96,340.23
Number of insured people 863,057.20 902,065.70 111,228.50 6,358,225.00
There are 306 Hospital Referral Regions in the US.
Quality differentiation can lead to persistent differences in price and demand across hos-
pitals. To control for qualitative effects, we include major hospitals’ quality scores listed on
U.S. News & World Report. U.S. News & World Report releases its annual rankings and
quality scores of hospitals in 16 different adult specialties listed in Table 4. It considers
almost 5,000 hospitals and approximately the top 150 hospitals are ranked in at least one
specialty. Quality criteria include a sufficient number of beds, specialized staff, sufficient
medical technology, survival rates, patient safety, hospital reputation, and whether it is a
teaching hospital or not.5 Thus, the ranked hospitals offer high quality of care in the HHRs.
In our empirical analysis, we control for each referral hospital quality based on their scores
on the report. Our study also includes the number of insured people as one of the covari-
ates in our regression model to account for the effects of a potential expansion of coverage
based on existing plans. We estimate these models with HHR fixed effects to control for
unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics of demand across markets. Summary statistics of
these regression variables are presented in Table 1. The average price and average number
of discharges per hospital per Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) are about $9,607 and 42,
5See Olmsted et al. (2017) for more details about current methodology and criteria for ranking hospitals
by U.S. News & World Report.
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respectively. There are on average 6 hospitals in an HRR during the sample period.
3 Empirical Analysis
In the empirical analysis that follows, we estimate the demand in the health care industry.
By directly estimating the demand, we are able to obtain also consistent hospital markup
estimates.6 The estimated demand parameters are reported in Table 2. The first column
has a basic set of covariates, and the next three columns successively add hospital’s number
of medical procedures, number of insured people, and household income. The coefficients of
the log of price across all our regressions are in line with expectations. The log of rival’s
minimum price is positive and statistically significant indicating that patients are likely to
pay higher prices at a hospital if rival hospitals charge high prices.
With regard to hospital’s quality, patients would pay more to well-known hospitals that
provide high quality care and to large hospital organizations. This variable shifts the demand
curve outwards in the health care market. The higher the log of the number of medical
procedures is, the higher the price paid, indicating that patients are likely to pay higher
prices to a hospital offering broad tertiary medical care. The impacts of the population
size, the number of insured people, and household income on the market demand are not
statistically significant across our specifications. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 report the
estimates from regressions based on the parsimonious model of column (1) controlling for
6Note that, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) draw inferences about price-cost margins by observing the number
of firms relative to the size of their market.
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Table 2: Estimation Results
Log (number of discharges) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (average price) -0.034*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.067*** -0.139***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log (rivals’ minimum price) 0.020*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.060***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log (hospital quality score) 0.137*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Log (population) 0.050 0.035 -0.118 -0.118 -0.109 0.149
(0.332) (0.319) (0.635) (0.635) (0.624) (0.302)
Log (number of procedures) 0.394*** 0.394*** 0.394*** 0.423***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log (number of insured people) 0.131 0.132 0.102
(0.464) (0.465) (0.457)
Log (income) 0.005 0.016
(0.128) (0.126)
Cardiology & Heart Surgery -0.095***
(0.006)
Diabetes & Endocrinology -0.381***
(0.009)
Ear, Nose & Throat -0.315***
(0.007)














HRR Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 317,453 317,453 317,453 317,453 317,453 317,453
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and * denotes
significance at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
different specialties (in column (5)) and hospital fixed effects (in column (6)).7
In order to examine the impact of patient travel distance to hospitals on markups, we
approximate the distance of a patient from a hospital by calculating the distance of the county
center to the hospital location. After calculating distances between each referral hospital and
the center of every county within an HRR we take the average of the distances to each location
in the regression. Table A1 in the appendix presents those additional empirical results. Our
empirical analysis reveals that the coefficient estimate on travel distance is negative across
models and statistically significant only in the most basic specification.8 The findings are
consistent with our expectations. According to more reliable estimation results (columns (5)
and (6)), there is no significant difference in the payment between local patients and distant
patients within the same HRRs. Patients seeking tertiary care are often referred to a major
hospital in the HRRs rather than choosing a tertiary hospital.
Table 3: Overall Lerner Index in the US Health Care Industry between 2010 and 2011
Number of Health Care Providers
1 2 3 4 5 More than 5
Lerner Index 0.622 0.367 0.292 0.253 0.253 0.251






then estimate the markup factor as
1
1− L . For all six demand specifications, the estimates
indicate that the demand for health care is inelastic. Table 3 and Figure 1 indicate that,
during the sample period, there is a clear pattern of variation in markups as a function of
the level of competition. As competition increases the estimated markups gradually decline.
7The omitted group is miscellaneous treatments for minor conditions.













1 2 3 4 5 > 5
Number of Health Care Providers
Figure 1: Overall Lerner Index in the US Health Care Industry between 2010 and 2011
For example, when there are two hospitals in an HHR, the markup is 1.58 times the cost of
treatments. When there are five hospitals in an HHR, the markup is only 34% above the
marginal cost.
We are also interested in controlling for price differences across medical specialties. Table
4 shows that there is naturally a considerable variation in prices across medical procedures.
For example, the average price of Cardiology & Heart Surgery is $9,838 while it is $5,882
for Rehabilitation. As expected, we observe higher average prices in complex treatments
as shown in Table 2. In order to capture this variations, we re-estimate the regressions for
selected specialties in Table 5. The estimation results are consistent with the findings in
Table 2.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Average Price across Medical specialties
specialty Number of Mean Standard Min MaxObservations Deviation
Average price 317,453 $9849.84 $7856.36 $2579.00 $443966.20
Cardiology & Heart Surgery 82,155 $9838.89 $6367.99 $2579.00 $443966.20
Diabetes & Endocrinology 3,557 $5882.93 $1507.69 $3824.27 $19511.96
Ear, Nose & Throat 21,639 $13004.68 $10778.86 $3155.36 $207251.70
Gastroenterology & GI Surgery 43,438 $12482.54 $11492.81 $3091.00 $135751.10
Nephrology 20,980 $12158.43 $12356.01 $3157.82 $140255.30
Neurology & Neurosurgery 31,876 $7880.35 $3593.78 $3333.73 $142314.80
Orthopedics 29,066 $13377.86 $7852.40 $3143.67 $131187.40
Pulmonology 42,840 $7027.38 $2493.21 $3338.18 $72797.93
Rehabilitation 10,929 $5916.43 $2202.56 $3108.10 $28762.63
Urology 13,438 $7319.61 $2954.70 $3579.73 $53835.75
Other 17,535 $6547.11 $3397.20 $3040.73 $247728.90
The other specialty group includes the following medical procedures: Syncope & Collapse,
Poisoning & Toxic Effects of Drugs, Cellulitis, and Psychoses.
Table 5: Estimation Results by Medical Procedures
Log (number of discharges) Cardiology Gastroenterology Nephrology Rehabilitation Urology&Heart &GI Surgery
Log (average price) -0.154*** -0.158*** -0.145*** -0.490*** -1.188***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.021) (0.019)
Log (rivals’ minimum price) 0.029*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.041*** 0.027***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Log (hospital quality score) 0.134*** 0.116*** 0.093*** 0.200*** 0.214***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.051) (0.009)
Log (population) -0.248 2.285 1.576 -2.797 -0.598
(1.161) (1.881) (2.162) (3.001) (2.660)
Log (number of procedures) 0.523*** 0.371*** 0.681*** 0.413*** 0.553***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009)
Log (number of insured people) 0.345 -1.493 -1.536 1.845 -0.045
(0.842) (1.376) (1.589) (2.165) (1.963)
Log (income) 0.098 -0.077 0.107 0.394 -0.200
(0.233) (0.385) (0.438) (0.580) (0.546)
HRR Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 82,155 43,438 20,980 10,929 13,438
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and * denotes significance
at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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4 Conclusion
In this article, we present estimates of the demand in the health care industry. The empirical
results show that rivals’ pricing strategy, hospital-specific quality, and the number of medical
procedures are the main factors that affect firm markups in the market. Finally, we provide
empirical evidence that localized competition in the health care industry is a critical factor
that determines hospital markups. Indeed, an increase in the level of competition leads to a
decrease in their markups in the health care industry.
It is clear that competition lowers prices. In the US, many local markets are dominated
by two to three large hospital systems due to a dramatic wave of hospital consolidation.
According to US Census Bureau, the rate of uninsured among the US population was almost
8.8% in 2016. Health care spending in the country was about $10,348 per person in 2016. The
Peterson-Kaiser Health System Tracker finds that the quality in the US health care system
has been improving in many years, but the comparable OECD countries that are similarly
wealthy based on GDP per capita outperform the US in a variety of quality measures,
including life expectancy at birth. As is evident from our empirical results, competition
could be the root of the problem in the US health care industry. Policy makers needs
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Table A1: Estimation Results
Log (number of discharges) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (average price) -0.035*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.068***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log (rivals’ minimum price) 0.020*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.039***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log (hospital quality score) 0.137*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log (distance) -0.004** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log (population) 0.040 0.015 -0.144 -0.145 -0.134
(0.332) (0.319) (0.635) (0.636) (0.625)
Log (number of procedures) 0.396*** 0.396*** 0.396*** 0.425***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log (number of insured people) 0.136 0.137 0.107
(0.465) (0.466) (0.457)
Log (income) 0.007 0.019
(0.128) (0.126)
Cardiology & Heart Surgery -0.095***
(0.006)
Diabetes & Endocrinology -0.381***
(0.009)
Ear, Nose & Throat -0.314***
(0.007)














HRR Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 317,453 317,453 317,453 317,453 317,453
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and * denotes
significance at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
